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43 
LEGAL AFFAIRS:  
DREYFUS, GUANTÁNAMO, AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE 




The Dreyfus affair reminds us that the rule of law and basic 
human rights are not self-executing.  In a democracy, individual 
rights and the rule of law are designed to check popular power and 
protect the individual from the majority.1  Yet paradoxically, they 
cannot do so without substantial popular support.  Alfred Dreyfus re-
ceived two trials—or at least the trappings thereof—and was twice 
wrongly convicted.2  The rule of law was initially unable to stand be-
tween an innocent man and the powerful men who sought to frame 
him.  But the issue of Dreyfus‟s guilt or innocence was not concluded 
with his verdicts.  Thanks to the work of many supporters inside and 
outside of France, including, most famously, Émile Zola, Dreyfus 
was ultimately exonerated and his accusers were revealed for the 
criminals that they were.  Justice ultimately triumphed—but only be-
cause of the substantial political pressure brought to bear on his be-
half.3 
 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  This essay is adapted from ideas 
first explored in David Cole, After September 11: What We Still Don’t Know, THE N.Y. REV. 
OF BOOKS (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/sep/29/after-
september-11-what-we-still-dont-know, and developed further in David Cole, Where Liberty 
Lies: Civil Society and Individual Rights After September 11, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 1203 
(2012).  
1 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745 (2008). 
2 See generally LOUIS BEGLEY, WHY THE DREYFUS AFFAIR MATTERS (2009); GEORGE R. 
WHYTE, THE DREYFUS AFFAIR: A CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY (2008); Adam Gopnik, Trial of 
the Century: Revisiting the Dreyfus Affair, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 28, 2009), 
http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/books/2009/09/28/090928crbo_books_gopnik. 
3 See Gopnik, supra note 2 (“Stirred into movement by Mathieu, the entire liberal estab-
lishment, frightened and feeble at first, began to enlist in the cause; the great left-wing politi-
cian Jean Jaurès joined, then the publisher and future Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, 
then the novelist Émile Zola—none of them Jewish, but with a certain self-interest in seeing 
the right done down, and, above all, with a passion for republicanism and a sense that it 
could not survive this parody of justice.”).  
1
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A similar story can be told about Guantánamo and the United 
States‟ “war on terror” in the wake of the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001.  Here, too, the powerful initially subverted the rules to 
achieve their desired ends,4 and the victims were a minority with little 
or no “voice” in the domestic political system.5  But once again, sub-
stantial pressure by citizens and foreigners in defense of the rule of 
law forced the government to back down and retreat, if not necessari-
ly to admit its errors or crimes.6 
As Professor Gary Shaw has eloquently demonstrated in his 
essay in this volume, the Supreme Court imposed significant and his-
toric constraints on the executive branch‟s attempts to subject “ene-
my combatants” to “military justice.”7  Over strenuous executive ob-
jections, the Court ruled that detainees at Guantánamo had a right to 
seek judicial review of the legality of their detentions as alleged 
“enemy combatants”—even after Congress sided with the president 
to repeal all statutory avenues of habeas corpus review.8  The Court 
ruled further, again over the administration‟s national-security based 
objections, that United States citizens detained as “enemy comba-
tants” were entitled, as a matter of due process, to notice of the case 
against them and a meaningful opportunity to defend themselves be-
fore an objective arbiter.9  And the Court rejected the administration‟s 
position that alleged fighters for al Qaeda were not entitled to the pro-
tections of the Geneva Conventions, a holding whose significance ex-
tended far beyond the Court‟s decision to invalidate the President‟s 
unilaterally created military commissions.10  Because it extended Ge-
neva Convention protections to the detainees, for example, the deci-
sion implied that inflicting cruel or inhumane treatment on detainees 
was a war crime.11  
 
4 DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN 
THE WAR ON TERRORISM 85 (2003). 
5 Id. at 21-23, 26-27. 
6 David Cole, After September 11: What We Still Don’t Know, THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 
(Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/sep/29/after-september-11-
what-we-still-dont-know. 
7 Gary Shaw, Due Process in American Military Tribunals After September 11, 2001, 29 
TOURO L. REV. 29 (2012). 
8 See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732, 771 (holding that detainees at Guantánamo had 
constitutional right to habeas corpus); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481, 484 (2004) (holding 
that detainees at Guantánamo had statutory right to habeas corpus). 
9 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004). 
10 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567, 628 (2006). 
11 Id. at 560, 563 (“The military commission at issue lacks the power to proceed because 
2
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Those decisions, however, are only a part of the story.  In this 
essay, I will reflect more broadly on the course of events that the ter-
rorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (“9/11”), triggered in the United 
States, and attempt to draw some contemporary lessons, inspired by 
the Dreyfus affair, from what we might someday call the Guantána-
mo affair.  Many accounts have focused on the response of the Bush 
administration to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.12  I want to shift the fo-
cus, however, and examine the response of ordinary citizens, within 
and outside the United States, to the American “war on terror.”  As 
with the Dreyfus affair, it is that response that ultimately helped to 
determine the course of history. 
As it is now well known, the Bush administration initially re-
sponded to the threat of terrorist attacks by, for all practical purposes, 
jettisoning the rule of law as an inconvenient obstacle to Americans‟ 
security.13  The administration adopted a “preventive paradigm,” in 
which harshly coercive measures, from detention to torture, to war 
itself, were employed preemptively, ostensibly to prevent terrorist at-
tacks before they occurred.14  It frequently sought to justify its meas-
ures, both legally and politically, by stressing that they applied only 
to “them,” which in this case meant foreign nationals—specifically 
Arab and Muslim foreign nationals—and not “us,” United States citi-
zens.15 
At the Guantánamo Bay naval base, the administration sought 
to hold detainees beyond the law, subjected them to cruel and inhu-
man treatment, and in some instances, torture, and denied them 
 
its structure and procedures violate . . . the four Geneva Conventions[,] . . . [but] the Execu-
tive nevertheless must comply with the prevailing rule of law in undertaking[s] to try [detai-
nees] and subject [them] to criminal punishment.”).  At the time, the war crimes statute de-
fined war crimes to include any “breach of common Article 3” of the Geneva Conventions, 
which, in turn, prohibited all “cruel or inhuman treatment” of detainees.  18 U.S.C. § 2441 
(2006).  Congress subsequently amended the statute to limit war crimes to certain “grave 
breaches,” not including cruel and inhuman treatment.  18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2012). 
12 See, e.g., JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON 
TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008); JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR 
PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007); DAVID COLE & 
JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR 26 
(2007) [hereinafter COLE & LOBEL, LESS SAFE] (describing the Bush administrations treat-
ment of detainees). 
13 See generally COLE & LOBEL, LESS SAFE, supra note 12. 
14 Id. at 34 (“As President Bush put it, „If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will 
have waited too long.‟ ”). 
15 COLE, supra note 4, at 40. 
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access to court.16  Ultimately, 779 men were held there; however, as 
of today approximately 600 have been released.17  Guantánamo was 
reserved for foreign nationals, and the government argued that it 
could treat human beings in this way because they were foreign na-
tionals outside the United States‟ borders.18 
Within the United States, the administration similarly em-
barked on a widespread detention initiative.19  In the first two years 
after 9/11 over 5000 foreign nationals were detained in preventive de-
tention measures, the vast majority in connection with immigration 
charges, often for highly technical violations.20  Virtually all of those 
detained were from Arab or Muslim countries.21  Many, rounded up 
in the first few months after the attacks, were presumed to be “of in-
terest” to the 9/11 investigation on little or no evidence beyond their 
national origin, and detained until the FBI “cleared” them of any such 
connection.22  Not one of these men stands convicted of a terrorist of-
fense.23  The FBI sought out another 8000 foreign nationals for “vo-
luntary” interviews, selected solely because they were young men 
from Arab or Muslim countries.24  Once again, none turned out to be 
terrorists.25  The government required more than 80,000 foreign na-
tionals from Arab and Muslim countries residing here to “register” 
with immigration authorities, and be fingerprinted, photographed, and 
interviewed.26  Again, none was convicted of a terrorist offense.27  
These measures were possible, both legally and politically, because 
those detained were foreign nationals not entitled to constitutional 
rights.28 
 
16 See generally MAYER, supra note 12. 
17 Guantánamo by the Numbers, HUM. RTS. FIRST, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/USLS-Fact-Sheet-Gitmo-Numbers.pdf (last updated Oct. 3, 2012). 
18 COLE, supra note 4, at 85. 
19 Id. at 22. 
20 Id. at 25-26. 
21 Id. at 25. 
22 U.S. Dep‟t of Justice, Office of the Inspector Gen., The Sept. 11 Detainees: A Review of 
the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation 
of the Sept. 11 Attacks 1, 5, 37, 77 (2003) [hereinafter The Sept. 11 Detainees]. 
23 COLE, supra note 4, at 25. 
24 COLE & LOBEL, LESS SAFE, supra note 12, at 107; see also The Sept. 11 Detainees, su-
pra note 22, at 4. 
25 COLE & LOBEL, LESS SAFE, supra note 12, at 107. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 COLE, supra note 4; see also Neal K. Katyal, Equality in the War on Terror, 59 STAN. 
L. REV. 1365, 1379 (2007). 
4
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By unilateral executive order, the Bush administration also 
created military commissions in which defendants could be tried, 
convicted, and sentenced to death by a system entirely under the au-
thority of the President without any judicial review.29  The rules did 
not bar the admission of coerced confessions.30  And again, the rules 
applied only to foreign nationals.31 
The administration authorized the abduction and “disappear-
ance” of terrorism suspects into secret Central Intelligence Agency 
(“CIA”) prisons, known as “black sites,” where they were subjected 
to what the administration called “enhanced interrogation tech-
niques,” but are more properly characterized as “cruel, inhumane, and 
degrading,” and in some instances, torture.32  The President autho-
rized CIA interrogators to douse suspects with water, force them into 
painful stress positions and small dark boxes for hours at a time, hit 
them, slam them into walls, and “waterboard” them.33  These tactics 
were initially justified by secret legal memoranda that somehow ma-
naged to find that none of these tactics amounted to torture, and that 
the related prohibition on cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment, con-
tained in an international human rights treaty did not protect foreign 
nationals held by United States officials outside our borders.34  When 
Congress overruled that strained interpretation, and correctly insisted 
that the prohibition applied to all human beings held by the CIA, re-
gardless of the detainee‟s nationality, the Bush administration opined, 
in secret, that none of the tactics were even cruel, inhuman, or de-
grading in anyway.35  
The administration authorized the “rendition” of suspects to 
 
29 Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain 
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (Nov. 16, 2001). 
30 John Perazzo, Why Civilian Trials for Terrorists Are a Bad Idea, FRONT PAGE MAG 
(Feb. 6, 2007), http://www.archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=336.  
31 See Katyal, supra note 28, at 1366 (exempting American citizens from the order). 
32 MAYER, supra note 12, at 125, 143, 148. 
33 See id. at 165, 167-71 (describing the various punishment tactics employed on the de-
tainees). 
34 DAVID COLE, THE TORTURE MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINKABLE 19-35 (New 
Press 2009) [hereinafter COLE, THE TORTURE MEMOS] (summarizing the arguments pre-
sented in the memos to authorize the CIA‟s interrogation tactics). 
35 See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelli-
gence Agency, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Conven-
tion Against Torture to Certain Techniques That May be Used in the Interrogation of High 
Value al Qaeda Detainees (May 30, 2005), reprinted in COLE, THE TORTURE MEMOS, supra 
note 34, at 225-26 (concluding that the CIA‟s interrogation tactics were not cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading, and therefore met the obligations of Article 16). 
5
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security services in foreign countries that the State Department had 
long condemned for systematic use of torture—such as Syria, Egypt, 
and Morocco.36  When Maher Arar, a Canadian, sued United States 
officials for delivering him to Syria to be tortured, the government 
argued that Arar‟s treatment, including United States officials‟ deci-
sion to fly him to Syria, and his subsequent torture by the Syrians at 
the behest of the United States, violated no constitutional rights be-
cause he was a foreign national who was not residing in the United 
States.37 
These early post-9/11 measures echo the federal govern-
ment‟s reaction to a series of terrorist bombings eighty years earlier.  
The summer of 1919 saw the interception of mail bombs addressed to 
such figures as Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., 
and financiers J.P. Morgan and John D. Rockefeller; violent riots in 
several cities on May Day; and, on June 2, the explosions of eight 
bombs in eight different cities within the same hour, killing two men, 
and ripping the front off of the Georgetown home of Attorney Gener-
al A. Mitchell Palmer.38  The United States responded by rounding up 
more than 1000 foreign nationals in coordinated raids across the 
country.39  Most were picked up on technical immigration violations 
or charges of association with various communist groups.40  No one 
was convicted in the bombings.  As Louis F. Post, a government offi-
cial at the time, later wrote, the “force of the delirium [caused by the 
bombings] turned in the direction of a deportations crusade with the 
spontaneity of water flowing along the course of least resistance.”41 
As in 1919, the focus of the government‟s post-9/11 response 
on foreign nationals, and particularly Arab and Muslim foreign na-
tionals, made its measures easier to “sell” to, and less likely to en-
gender objection from the American public.  When, as is often the 
case, a democracy responds to a crisis by targeting those who are a 
minority, or worse yet, unrepresented, the political process is unlikely 
to weigh the costs and benefits fairly.  To the majority, it seems that 
they can have their security and their liberty too, as the government‟s 
 
36 MAYER, supra note 12, at 109-10, 113; see also Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 
256 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).  
37 See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 275. 
38 COLE, supra note 4, at 117-18. 
39 Id. at 118-19. 
40 See generally LOUIS F. POST, THE DEPORTATIONS DELIRIUM OF NINETEEN-TWENTY: A 
PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF AN HISTORIC OFFICIAL EXPERIENCE 38 (1923). 
41 Id. at 307. 
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initiatives threaten not their rights, but the rights of others.  For that 
reason, democracies are likely to overreact in times of crisis. 
Given the focus of so many of the post-9/11 measures on for-
eign nationals, one might well expect that they would engender little 
popular opposition.  Neither Congress nor a majority of the American 
public could be expected to object as the measures did not, for the 
most part, implicate the rights of citizens.  What is perhaps most sur-
prising, then, is the fact that on virtually all of these fronts, President 
Bush was nonetheless forced to retreat.  When the secret August 1, 
2002, Justice Department memo authorizing torture was leaked to the 
Washington Post and published on the Post website, the administra-
tion swiftly retracted the memo; it could not defend in public what it 
had rubber-stamped in secret.42  Similarly, when the New York Times 
disclosed the existence of a secret National Security Agency program 
that had conducted sweeping warrantless electronic surveillance, in 
defiance of a criminal prohibition in the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act, the administration ultimately suspended the unilateral ex-
ecutive program and replaced it with one subject to judicial oversight 
and approval.43 
When European nations objected to the “extraordinary rendi-
tion” program,44 reported renditions of torture grew more infrequent.  
When, during Senate hearings on the nomination of Alberto Gonzales 
to be Attorney General, the administration disclosed for the first time 
that it had secretly interpreted the international treaty prohibition on 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment not to apply to foreign na-
tionals, held by the CIA outside of our borders, Congress resounding-
ly rejected that interpretation by enacting an amendment sponsored 
by Senator John McCain making clear that the prohibition applied to 
all persons held by the United States, irrespective of location or na-
 
42 See Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture, 
WASH. POST (June 8, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23373-
2004Jun7.html; COLE, THE TORTURE MEMOS, supra note 34, at 225-26 (discussing the Bush 
administration‟s release of a replacement memo on interrogation tactics in December 2004). 
(see rule 16.6(f)) 
43 See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?pagewanted=all 
(describing the warrantless monitoring of both international telephone calls and emails). 
44 See EU Parliament, Report on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for 
the Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, at 6, 11 (Jan. 30, 2007), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/comparl/tempcom/tdip/final_report_en.pdf (reporting on “ex-
traordinary arrests and renditions”). 
7
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tionality.45 
And as noted above, and explicated in more detail by Gary 
Shaw, the Supreme Court ruled against the administration on four 
separate occasions with respect to the administration‟s asserted power 
to detain and try “enemy combatants,” insisting that the courts, the 
Constitution, and the laws of war have an important role to play in 
checking executive power. 
President Obama‟s 2008 presidential campaign featured sharp 
criticism of many of the above initiatives, and Obama introduced fur-
ther reforms when he assumed office.46  After his election, he closed 
the CIA‟s secret prisons, forbade “enhanced interrogation tech-
niques,” promised to close the prison at Guantánamo Bay within one 
year, and released several previously secret Office of Legal Counsel 
(“OLC”) memos authorizing “enhanced interrogation techniques” 
long after the initial memo had been disclosed and formally res-
cinded.47  In May 2009, President Obama gave a major speech on na-
tional security in which he insisted on the importance of fighting ter-
rorism within the constraints of the rule of law and our Constitution.48  
He abandoned his predecessor‟s claim that as Commander-in-Chief, 
the President cannot be checked by the other branches in terms of 
how he “engages the enemy.”49  When a panel of the District of Co-
 
45 See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1001, 119 Stat. 2739 
(2005) (“No individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States 
Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhu-
man, or degrading treatment or punishment.”). 
46 See Obama Names Intel Picks, Vows No Torture, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28574408/ns/politics-white_house/#.UDMBmULv1UQ (last 
updated Jan. 9, 2009) (statement of President Obama) (“We will abide by the Geneva Con-
ventions.  We will uphold our highest ideals.”). 
47 Id.; Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4897-98 (Jan. 22, 2009); Press Release, 
President of the United States, Statement of President Barack Obama on Release of OLC 
Memos (Apr. 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-of-President-Barack-Obama-on-
Release-of-OLC-Memos/; see also Mark Mazzetti & William Glaberson, Obama Issues Di-
rective to Shut Down Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/us/politics/22gitmo.html?_r=1. 
48 Press Release, President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security 
(May 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
national-security-5-21-09. 
49 Id.; see also Ross Douthat, All the President’s Privileges, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/opinion/sunday/douthat-all-the-presidents-
privileges.html?_r=1 (explaining that the Obama administration has rejected former Presi-
dent Bush‟s “expansive view of executive authority”).  Compare U.S. Dep‟t of Justice, Legal 
Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the Pres-
ident 32 n.15 (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf (set-
8
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lumbia Circuit ruled that his detention authority at Guantánamo was 
not bound by the laws of war,50 he took the extraordinary step of ar-
guing that the court had granted him too much power, submitting a 
brief to the full court that insisted that in fact his powers are con-
strained by the laws of war.51  The full court then vacated that aspect 
of the panel‟s decision.52 
President Obama‟s record on respecting human rights and the 
rule of law remains far from perfect.  He has relied on overbroad 
claims of secrecy, both to resist lawsuits on behalf of torture victims 
seeking redress,53 and to keep from public view the contours of his 
“targeted killing” policy, pursuant to which he has authorized the 
killing even of an American citizen, without trial and far from any 
battlefield, without trial.54  He has successfully resisted judicial re-
view of detentions at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan.55  Pres-
ident Obama has continued his predecessor‟s sweeping interpretation 
of a law criminalizing “material support” to designated “foreign ter-
rorist organizations,” contending that it prohibits even advocacy of 
human rights and peace, including the filing of an amicus brief in the 
Supreme Court, if the advocacy is done on behalf of an organization 
that the government has labeled terrorist.56  He has resisted all efforts 
to pursue accountability for the wrongs done by federal officials in 
the “war on terror,” opposing even the formation of a nonpartisan 
blue-ribbon commission to report on what went wrong.57  We now 
 
ting forth Bush administration‟s view of executive power), with David Cole, Reviving the 
Nixon Doctrine: NSA Spying, the Commander-in-Chief, and Executive Power in the War on 
Terror, 13 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 17, 18 (2006) (discussing President 
Bush‟s claim that other branches cannot check the Commander-in-Chief‟s methods of “en-
gaging the enemy”). 
50 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871-72 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
1814 (2011). 
51 Brief for Appellees at 21, Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 09-
5051), 2009 WL 2957826. 
52 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 52-53 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
53 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. de-
nied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011). 
54 See David Cole, Killing Our Citizens Without Trial, THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Nov. 24, 
2011), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/nov/24/killing-our-citizens-without-
trial/; David Cole, Killing Our Citizens in Secret, THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Oct. 9, 2011, 
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/oct/09/killing-citizens-secret/. 
55 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
56 Brief for Respondents Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) 
(No. 08-1498, 09-89), 2009 WL 4951303 at 25-26, 33, 39.  
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know, for example, that President Bush and Vice-President Cheney 
personally authorized waterboarding, which Obama correctly ac-
knowledges is torture, yet there has been no official effort to hold 
them accountable for such conduct. 
Still, many of the government‟s initial measures have been 
abandoned.  The United States‟ effort to protect its citizens from ter-
rorist attacks by al Qaeda and the Taliban is being carried out today 
in a much more law-abiding manner than in the first several years af-
ter 9/11. 
To what should we attribute these changes?  With the excep-
tion of the McCain Amendment, Congress failed to play a checking 
role.  It passed the USA PATRIOT Act in the weeks after the at-
tacks.58  It repealed habeas corpus for Guantánamo detainees in re-
sponse to the Supreme Court‟s 2004 decision that construed the ha-
beas corpus statute to grant the detainees review.59  It largely ratified 
the president‟s military commissions in 2006 by reversing the Court‟s 
decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld60 that the military commissions were 
illegal.61 
The Supreme Court played more of a constraining role than 
Congress did, and more than the Court itself had played in past crises.  
Even here, however, the Court‟s rebuffs were limited.  Two of its 
four decisions, Boumediene v. Bush62 and Rasul v. Bush,63 addressed 
only the threshold issue of whether detainees at Guantánamo could be 
heard in court at all.  Those decisions, while ensuring access to the 
courts, did not rule on what substantive rights the detainees may 
have.  Additionally, the Court has declined to review the critical 
question of what a court can order when it concludes that a detainee 
 
ncy/cia_interrogations/index.html (reporting President Obama‟s refusal to “re-examine the 
treatment of prisoners and the use of harsh interrogation tactics”). 
58 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (2001). 
59 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) 
(“No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear . . . an application for a writ of 
habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been 
determined . . . to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such 
determination.”); see also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 575-76. 
60 548 U.S. 557 (2006); see also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 576 (arguing that Congress has 
failed to “expressly reserve federal courts‟ jurisdiction”). 
61 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). 
62 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
63 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
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is not lawfully held, but cannot be returned to his country of origin 
because of a credible fear of torture.64 
A third decision, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,65 established that United 
States citizens held as “enemy combatants” have a due process right 
to notice of the case against them and a meaningful opportunity to re-
spond.66  However, the Court left unresolved the specific process due, 
and the Bush administration circumvented further elaboration on that 
issue by releasing Hamdi rather than giving him a fair hearing.67  The 
fourth detainee decision, Hamdan, which concerned the legality of 
President Bush‟s military commissions, rested solely on statutory 
grounds and, as noted above, was effectively reversed by the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006.68 
Moreover, while district courts exercising habeas corpus ju-
risdiction initially ruled in favor of the detainees in the large majority 
of cases they heard, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit has consistently sided with the government on its appeals, and 
has eased the government‟s burden to demonstrate that a detainee is 
lawfully held.69  The Supreme Court has repeatedly denied petitions 
for certiorari from these D.C. Circuit decisions.70 
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court‟s other post-9/11 national se-
curity decisions have all been decided in the government‟s favor.71  
 
64 See Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that federal judge 
may not order release of such a detainee into the United States), vacated and remanded, 130 
S. Ct. 458 (2009), reinstated and modified 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
65 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
66 Id. at 533. 
67 See id. at 535-39; see also Eric Lichtblau, U.S., Bowing to Court, to Free “Enemy Com-
batant,” N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/23/politics/23hamdi.html 
(“The [Bush administration] decided that rather than give Mr. Hamdi a hearing, it would 
simply negotiate his release.”). 
68 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006); see 
also Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557. 
69 Stephen Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1451, 
1466 (2011). 
70 See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011) (denying certiorari); Al-
Madhwani v. Obama, 132 S. Ct. 2739 (2012) (denying certiorari); Uthman v. Obama, 132 S. 
Ct. 2739 (2012) (denying certiorari); Almerfedi v. Obama, 132 S. Ct. 2739 (2012) (denying 
certiorari); Al Alwi v. Obama, 132 S. Ct. 2739 (2012) (denying certiorari); Latif v. Obama, 
132 S. Ct. 2741 (2012) (denying certiorari); Al Kandari v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2741 
(2012) (denying certiorari). 
71 See generally Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2731 (2010) (hold-
ing “that, in regulating the particular forms of support that plaintiffs seek to provide to for-
eign terrorist organizations, Congress has pursued that objective consistent with the limita-
tions of the First and Fifth Amendments”).  
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The Court rejected two lawsuits seeking damages against Attorney 
General John Ashcroft for alleged unconstitutional detentions in the 
roundups that occurred in the wake of 9/11.72  And the Court rejected 
a First Amendment challenge to the criminalization of pure speech 
advocating peace and human rights under the “material support” sta-
tute.73 
The Court‟s record on protecting human rights, in short, while 
better than in previous crises, is mixed.  Moreover, most of the Bush 
administration‟s curtailments of its aggressive initiatives enumerated 
above were not ordered by a court.  No court ordered the abandon-
ment of the first torture memo, an end to extraordinary rendition, the 
suspension of the NSA warrantless wiretapping program, the release 
of the secret torture memos, or the closure of the CIA‟s black sites.74  
Approximately 600 men have been released from Guantánamo, but 
the vast majority was released without a court order, and none have 
been released under a non-appealable court order.  While several dis-
trict courts have ordered the release of Guantánamo detainees, every 
time the administration has appealed to the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit (“D.C. Circuit”), it has prevailed.75  No court ordered the admin-
istration to abandon the Article II Commander-in-Chief theory of un-
checkable executive power.  Additionally, as noted above, when the 
D.C. Circuit ruled that international law did not play any role in con-
straining the president‟s detention authority, President Obama in ef-
fect objected that the court had granted him too much unchecked au-
thority, and insisted that his actions were bound by international law. 
What, then, caused the United States, specifically the execu-
tive branch, to change course?  In my view, they were much the same 
sorts of forces that worked to vindicate Alfred Dreyfus: not the for-
mal separation of powers, but informal nongovernmental resistance 
in the name of upholding the rule of law.  As in the Dreyfus affair, 
this resistance took the form of individuals, acting on their own and 
 
72 Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (finding that “Ashcroft did not vi-
olate clearly established law”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009). 
73 Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2712. 
74 See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that pris-
oners at the Guantánamo base had no rights that could be vindicated by a federal court). 
75 See generally Mark Denbeaux et al., No Hearing Habeas: D.C. Circuit Restricts Mea-
ningful Review 2 (May 1, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2145554 (explaining that after the 
court‟s decision in Al Adahi, the District Court for the District Columbia has denied eleven 
out of twelve petitions for habeas corpus). 
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in association with others, speaking out, issuing critical reports, orga-
nizing protests, filing lawsuits, and generally challenging perceived 
abuses of power.76  As in the Dreyfus affair, the media played a criti-
cal role, by disclosing secret rights abuses and writing countless edi-
torials espousing the importance of adhering to the rule of law and 
the Constitution.  Were it not for leaks reported in the media, we 
would not know about the torture at Abu Ghraib, the torture memo, 
the NSA warrantless wiretapping program, secret CIA prisons, and 
extraordinary renditions to torture. 
In addition, international voices played a major role.  Guantá-
namo, after all, held nationals from forty-two countries, and some of 
those countries objected strongly to the way their countrymen were 
treated there.  A former United Kingdom Law Lord, Lord Steyn, 
dubbed Guantánamo a “legal black hole,” and 175 members of the 
Houses of Parliament filed an amicus brief on the Guantánamo detai-
nees‟ behalf in the Supreme Court.77  Together, these informal forces 
are responsible, as much as the formal separation of powers, for rein-
ing in the United States‟ “war on terror” in important ways. 
What lessons, then, can we draw from the Dreyfus affair and 
the first post-9/11 decade?  The first is that the rule of law and indi-
vidual rights are all too vulnerable to fear and demagoguery in times 
of crisis.  Designed to constrain short-sighted decision making by in-
sisting on adherence to basic principles of fairness, constitutional 
rights often seem inconvenient obstacles in a crisis.  For Dreyfus and 
many Arabs and Muslims after 9/11, the law was initially unable to 
offer much, if any, protection.  But both affairs also suggest that the 
rule of law is more resilient than many cynics might think.  Alfred 
Dreyfus was eventually exonerated.  The rule of law recovered in 
significant measure from its hasty dismissal in the aftermath of the 
9/11 terrorist attacks.  However, in both instances, the tide turned on-
ly because individuals, associations, and nongovernmental organiza-
 
76 David Cole, Where Liberty Lies: Civil Society and Individual Rights After 9/11, 57 
WAYNE L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2012). 
77 Lord Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, Twenty-Seventh F.A. Mann 
Lecture, STATEWATCH NEWS ONLINE (Nov. 25, 2003), 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/nov/guantanamo.pdf; see also Brief of 175 Members 
of Both Houses of the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Irel-
and as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 
03-343, 03-334), 2004 WL 96766 (“Each of the amici curiae is a serving member of one of 
the two Houses of Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: 
the House of Commons and the House of Lords.”). 
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tions mobilized behind the cause of justice for the vulnerable.  When 
it comes to the reality of rights protections, much depends on the mo-
bilization of the polity. 
But as the other “affair” under examination in this confe-
rence—the lynching of American Jewish businessman Leo Frank—
chillingly demonstrates, popular mobilization can go either way.78  
When, in 1915, Georgia‟s governor commuted Frank‟s death sen-
tence for murder to life without imprisonment, based on substantial 
concerns with the fairness of the trial and the accuracy of the verdict, 
a mob gathered, abducted Frank from his cell, and lynched him.79  
Popular mobilization does not always take the side of human rights, 
and it can easily overwhelm legal bulwarks through brute force and 
terror. 
Precisely because they help to establish and reinforce a cul-
ture of respect for equality and the rule of law, the assessments and 
reassessments of the “Dreyfus affair” that continue to this day in 
France are critically important for sustaining contemporary commit-
ments to the rule of law.  The fact that the case has become an “af-
fair,” a narrative widely known, exhaustively studied, and frequently 
invoked is crucial, for the history of the “affair” reminds us of what 
can go wrong when we depart from principles of fairness and justice.  
Whether the story of the United States‟ response to 9/11 will similar-
ly become an “affair” from which the United States and others draw 
lessons about resisting the temptation to sacrifice our fundamental 
commitments on the backs of the most vulnerable, remains to be 
seen.  As was the case with Dreyfus for many years, the particular 
lessons to be drawn from the post-9/11 era are a matter of deep con-
testation.  President Bush, Vice-President Cheney, and their suppor-
ters have sought to portray their actions as tough, but necessary and 
reasonable, decisions to recalibrate security and liberty.80 
Others, myself included, have insisted that the principal les-
 
78 See Frank v. State, 80 S.E. 1016, 1034 (Ga. 1914) (affirming the conviction and death 
sentence of defendant Leo Frank). 
79 See Curator, The Judicial Conclusion of the Leo Frank Case (1913 to 1915) and it’s 
[sic] Aftermath (1982 to 1986), THE 1913 LEO FRANK CASE AND TRIAL RES. LIBR. (Apr. 26, 
2012), http://www.leofrank.org/conclusion/ (explaining how a lynch mob took justice into 
their own hands after Leo Frank‟s death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment). 
80 See, e.g., David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Cheney’s Power No Longer Goes Unques-
tioned, N.Y. TIMES  (Sept. 10, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/10/washington/10cheney.html?pagewanted=all (statement 
of Mr. Cheney: “I have the freedom and the luxury, as does the president, of doing what we 
think is right for the country.”).  
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son of the first post-9/11 decade is that sacrifices in the rule of law 
are all too easy to make, generally unnecessary, and come at a great 
cost to the legitimacy and long-term success of a democracy‟s strug-
gle against terrorism.  The fact that Guantánamo has become one of 
the world‟s leading symbols for “lawlessness” suggests that the latter 
narrative has taken hold, at least in the rest of the world.  The struggle 
over its meaning within the United States, however, continues.81  At 
stake is nothing less than the nature of our constitutional culture.  
Whether, after the next attack, we repeat our mistakes or respond in a 
more resilient and rights-respecting manner depends ultimately on the 
lessons we learn as a nation from our recent past.  Those who are 
committed to the protection of civil liberties and the rule of law must 
continue to work to ensure that the “Guantánamo affair” takes on the 
character of the “Dreyfus affair” in popular consciousness.  At the 
end of the day, the strength of our legal protections turns on our cul-
ture‟s engaged commitment to the values of the Constitution, the rule 
of law, and human rights. 
 
81 See CNN Poll: Americans Split on Closing Guantanamo Bay Prison, CNN POL. (Jan. 
21, 2009), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/01/21/cnn-poll-americans-split-on-
closing-Guantanamo-bay-prison (showing the split among Americans over whether the 
Guantánamo Bay prison should be closed down). 
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